Sequana and the creditor duty: an offshore perspective
案例分析：Sequana 与董事对债权人责任—离岸视角
On 5 October 2022, the UK Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA & Ors [2022] UKSC 25. This judgment arose from an appeal brought by BTI 2014 LLC against a decision of the English Court of Appeal in 2019.
2022 年 10 月 5 日，英国最高法院就 BTI 2014 LLC 诉 Sequana SA & Ors [2022] UKSC 25 一案作出判决。该判决起因于 BTI 2014 LLC 对英国上诉法院 2019 年之裁定的上诉。 最高法院的判决是一项具有里程碑象征的决定，在公司法和董事责任领域具有重大意义。英国最高法院在判决中阐述了一些对于财政困难之公司的董事至关重要的问题﹑回答了所谓的“董事对债权人责任”是否存在及其范围的问题﹑并考虑了原本合法的公司股息分配批准可能会产生赔偿责任的情形，以及股东批准原则的范围。本文对其裁定作了概述，并就其对离岸司法管辖区可能具备的适用性提供深入分析。 该判决涉及公司董事在公司因长期环境义务而产生或有负债的情况下，批准向股东进行公司股息分配的决定，但产生此类负债的可能性和总量都不确定。公司在董事合法批准公司股息 分配之时有偿付能力，但几年后公司被认定无力偿债并进入破产管理程序。公司的一名受让人以该分配违反了“董事对债权人责任”为由，向董事提出了索赔；公司的一名债权人也以其分配是低于一般价值而订立的交易为由，要求驳回该分配。
The Supreme Court's judgment is a landmark decision of significant importance in the arena of company law and directors' duties. It provides welcome clarification from the UK's highest court on issues that are of key importance to directors of companies in financial difficulty, addressing the question of the existence and scope of the so-called "creditor duty", as well as considering the circumstances in which the otherwise lawful approval of a distribution might give rise to liability, and the scope of the doctrine of shareholder ratification. This note briefly summarises the decision and provides insight into its likely application in offshore jurisdictions.
The Judgment concerned a decision taken by company directors to approve a distribution to shareholders in circumstances where the company had contingent liabilities arising from long-term environmental obligations, which were uncertain as to their likelihood to arise and as to quantum. The company was solvent when the distribution was lawfully approved by the directors, but several years later the contingent liabilities crystallised, and the company was then deemed insolvent and entered administration. Claims were brought by an assignee of the company against the directors, on the basis that the distribution was made in breach of the “creditor duty”, and by one of the company’s creditors to set aside the distribution on the basis that it was a transaction at an undervalue.
Existence of the “creditor duty”
The "creditor duty", otherwise referred to as the rule in West Mercia (taken from the leading decision of the English Court of Appeal in 1988), is the duty of company directors to consider, or to act in accordance with, the interests of a company's creditors when the company becomes insolvent, or when it approaches or is at real risk of insolvency.
In Sequana, the Supreme Court considered as a preliminary question whether the creditor duty existed at all, and decided unanimously that it did (referring to the "impressive unity of the authorities" in this area); the duty arises as a modification of the long-established common law fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith in the interests of the company. The Court also held unanimously that the "creditor duty" is not a free-standing duty of its own that is separately owed to creditors.
Application and scope of the creditor duty
The Court found in this case that the directors were not in breach of the creditor duty, and dismissed the appeal. However, in dismissing the appeal, the Court made the following key findings in terms of the scope or “content” of the creditor duty:
- The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal's view that the creditor duty is triggered simply because insolvency is probable (i.e. it is more likely than not to occur), holding that the creditor duty does not arise merely because the company is at real risk of insolvency which is neither probable nor imminent. Rather, the creditor duty is engaged when directors know, or ought to know, that the company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, or that an insolvent liquidation or administration is probable.
- the Court held that it was not correct that the interests of creditors are necessarily paramount when a company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, but liquidation or administration has not become inevitable. In this scenario, directors should consider the interests of creditors and balance them against the interests of shareholders where they may conflict. The greater the company's financial difficulties, the more the directors should prioritise the interests of creditors. However, where an insolvent liquidation or administration is inevitable, creditors' interests become paramount as from that point the shareholders cease to retain any valuable interest in the company.
Application to lawful distributions
Having verified the existence of the creditor duty, the Court went on to consider whether that duty could apply to a decision by directors to pay a dividend which is otherwise lawful. The Court unanimously ruled that it could. This is because UK company law allows a distribution to be made from profits available on a balance sheet basis, leaving open the possibility that a company could lawfully pay a dividend whilst solvent on a balance sheet basis but insolvent on a cashflow basis.
Shareholder ratification
The Court also ruled that the creditor duty was not inconsistent or incompatible with the ratification principle, which can protect directors against claims for breach of duty where the company's shareholders have ratified the breach. All of the Justices were clear that the ratification principle could not apply to decisions made at a time when a company is insolvent or which render the company insolvent.
Application in offshore jurisdictions
A key part of the analysis in Sequana focussed on the meaning and effect of various provisions of the English Companies Act 2006, and the interplay between the English statutory regime applicable to directors' duties and the common law; in particular, section 172(3) of the Companies Act 2006 expressly recognises the existence at common law of the creditor duty.
We consider below how the reasoning in Sequana may be applied by the courts in Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey and Jersey, in circumstances where the relevant statutory regimes relating to company and insolvency law differ from those currently in place in England and Wales, and where English Supreme Court decisions are persuasive, but not binding.
Bermuda
The Bermuda Court held in Re First Virginia Reinsurance Ltd. [2003] Bda LR 47 that the directors' statutory duty to act in the best interests of the company under Section 97 of the Companies Act 1981 means, in the context of an insolvent Company, a duty to act in the best interest of creditors. The reasoning of Kawaley J (as he then was) is based on a remarkably similar statutory and common law analysis to that adopted by the UK Supreme Court in the Sequana Case.
In First Virginia the Court based the conclusion that directors' duties shift to creditors on the "the umbrella core principle of both corporate and personal insolvency law, that neither shareholders nor the bankrupt may participate in distributions from the estate until creditors are paid in full… embodied in section 72 of the [Bermuda] Bankruptcy Act (‘Right of bankrupt to surplus’) and section 225 as read with section 158 (g) of the [Bermuda] Companies Act". This principle has been adopted and applied by the Bermuda Courts so frequently since this decision that it is often stated without citation.
Based on the foregoing, the key contribution to Bermuda law that can be derived from the decision in Sequana is the clarification as to when the duty is engaged. It is expected that the Supreme Court's determination that the creditor duty is engaged when the directors know, or ought to know, that the company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, or that an insolvent liquidation or administration is probable in paragraphs [203]; [231] will be applied in Bermuda.
It is also likely that in the Bermuda context, the Bermuda Courts will consider the probability of a light touch provisional liquidation as engaging the creditor duty, as it has been expressly held by the Bermuda Courts to be analogous to administration under English Law.
As for the applicability of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sequana to the circumstances in which a dividend may become unlawful, the decision is unlikely to have a significant impact since Section 56 of the Companies Act 1981 expressly provides that a company shall not declare or pay a dividend, or make a distribution out of contributed surplus, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the company is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its liabilities as they become due or the realizable value of the company’s assets would thereby be less than its liabilities. Statutory provisions in relation to the payment of dividends are construed strictly in Bermuda (see e.g. the decision of the Bermuda Court of Appeal in Belvedere Insurance Company Ltd ((in Liquidation)) v Caliban Holdings Ltd [2001] Bda LR 2) and accordingly, the Supreme Court's formulation of the attachment point for the creditor duty (i.e. when the directors know, or ought to know that the company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency) and the statutory test under Section 56 of the Companies Act 1981 are very likely to be co-extensive in virtually every case.
British Virgin Islands
There are no reported decisions of the BVI courts where the rule in West Mercia has been expressly applied, although it is generally accepted that BVI common law does recognise a duty equivalent to the creditor duty established by that rule.
The BVI Business Companies Act 2004 (“BCA”) does not contain a detailed set of provisions equivalent to those in section 172 of the English Companies Act 2006, and there is no express reference to directors needing to take creditors' interests into account, although the common law relating to directors’ duties undoubtedly applies and so the Supreme Court's confirmation that the duty exists under common law likely puts this question beyond doubt.
However, section 120 of the BCA expressly allows directors to act in the interests of a shareholder in certain circumstances, even where to do so may not be in the best interests of the company itself. Although subject to the company’s constitutional documents and in some cases shareholder consent, these provisions can apply to subsidiary companies, allowing directors to act in the best interests of the parent, and joint venture companies, allowing directors to act in the interests of the shareholder who appointed them.
Perhaps surprisingly, the meaning and scope of these provisions (which have no equivalent in English company law) has never been considered by the courts, but there is potential for tension between these provisions and the creditor duty, which the Supreme Court has now held to be a fiduciary owed to the company. Given the seemingly unambiguous wording of these provisions, allowing directors to act in the interests of a shareholder even where that is not in the interests of the company, there is clearly scope for argument that the creditor duty is qualified in the BVI where these particular provisions apply.
Separately, on the question of how the creditor duty may apply in the context of otherwise lawful distributions by BVI companies, the provisions of the BCA differ from those in the UK, in that the directors of a company can only declare a dividend if, immediately after the payment of the dividend, it can satisfy the statutory solvency test at section 56 of the BCA; the test being whether the company is able to pay its debts as they fall due and the value of its assets is greater than the value of its liabilities. Accordingly, we consider that the creditor duty is of less practical relevance to the authorisation of distributions in the BVI, where the focus of the Court's inquiry would more likely be on the engagement of the statutory provisions in the BCA, rather than the question of whether the decision prejudiced the interests of creditors.
Cayman Islands
Directors' duties have not been codified into legislation in the Cayman Islands, and instead arise under common law.
The Cayman Courts have previously accepted that the creditor duty applies to directors of Cayman companies, and there is an existing body of case law recognising the duty. The duty as set out in West Mercia had been recognised by the Grand Court in Prospect Properties Limited v McNeill [1990–91 CILR 171], and in the recent Cayman Islands Court of Appeal judgment in AHAB v SAAD Investments Company Limited (21 December 2021, unreported, CICA (Civil) 15 of 2018), the Court of Appeal referred to the English Court of Appeal's decision in the Sequana case. The Court of Appeal in AHAB stated that the finding in Sequana that the creditor duty only arises when the directors know or should know that the company will probably become insolvent, was equally appropriate as a statement of the position under Cayman law.
Accordingly, the Cayman Courts will in all likelihood follow the UK Supreme Court judgment in the Sequana case as it relates to the creditor duty.
The Sequana judgment will likely have less practical relevance to distributions by Cayman companies. This is because the legal framework for the payment of distribution or dividends to shareholders, which is set out in section 34 of the Companies Act (2022 Revision), already provides that such a payment by a company to its shareholders is not lawful unless immediately following the date on which the payment is proposed to be made the company shall be able to pay its debts as they fall due in the ordinary course of business. It is a criminal offence on the part of the directors or managers of the company if the company makes such a payment when it is not able to pay its debts.
Guernsey
The judgment in Sequana is likely to be highly relevant to the law on directors' duties in Guernsey. Although many of the issues covered in the decision focus on matters of English statutory company law which do not have direct application to Guernsey, the Supreme Court's overall guidance on the content and engagement of the creditor duty is likely to be highly persuasive in cases which come before the Guernsey Royal Court.
The Royal Court's landmark judgment in Carlye in 2017 made clear that the creditor duty does exist under Guernsey law. Therefore, it seems likely that the guidance in Sequana as to the scope and application of the duty will be followed in Guernsey.
Further, on shareholder ratification, section 160 of the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (the "GCL") permits shareholders by passing an ordinary resolution to ratify acts of directors which exceed their powers or amount to negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company. However, section 160 also provides that it does not affect any other enactment or rule of law as to the requirements for valid ratification or any rule of law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the company. For this reason, common law authorities on shareholder ratification are still relevant in Guernsey. Therefore, the finding in Sequana that shareholders cannot ratify an act or decision of a director taken when the company is insolvent, or which causes the company to become insolvent, is likely to be persuasive in Guernsey.
Finally, where the Sequana judgment is likely to be less relevant in Guernsey is in the context of company dividends. Unlike the position under the UK Companies Act which as noted above allows a dividend to be paid from profits available on a balance sheet basis, in Guernsey a company can only declare a dividend if immediately after the payment of the dividend it can satisfy the statutory solvency test at section 527 of the GCL, namely it is able to pay its debts as they become due and the value of its assets is greater than the value of its liabilities.
Jersey
The Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 ("CJL") deals with Duties of Directors at Article 74 and requires them to "act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company; and [to] exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances". The CJL though is not a codifying law so the pre-existing customary law position remains and supplements the CJL. Whilst West Mercia has once been mentioned in a Jersey case, that was in a very limited cost hearing context and nothing can be drawn from that one instance. That notwithstanding, the position adopted by most Jersey Advocates would be one where the Creditor Duty was said to exist and our experience is that the Creditor Duty is frequently put to, and accepted by, the Court albeit in the absence of current authority to evidence this. Sequana is therefore very useful in reinforcing this point because the Courts in Jersey, in a matter such as this, will regard decisions of the UK Supreme Court as highly persuasive.
The points addressed in Sequana on dividends and shareholder ratification are less likely to be as important in Jersey as they will be elsewhere.
As a matter of Jersey law, insolvency is defined as "the inability to pay your debts as they fall due". A distribution under the CJL is an unlawful distribution unless the directors who are to authorize the distribution make a statement confirming that the company is (cash flow) solvent at the time of the distribution and further that it can continue to carry on its business and be (cash flow) solvent for a look forward period of 12 months.
Shareholder ratification of directors' acts is also possible under CJL but only where the appropriate resolutions are passed and where the company will be (cash flow) solvent after the time when the act or omission to be ratified occurs (ie if it is not solvent then the ratification fails in any event).
An extended version of this article first appeared in Volume 20, Issue 1 of International Corporate Rescue and is republished with the permission of Chase Cambria Publishing. A copy of the extended article is available to download at the top of this page.
是否存在“董事对债权人责任”
“董事对债权人责任”也被称为 West Mercia 规则（摘自 1988 年英国上诉法院的指导性判决）。它是指公司董事在公司破产或即将破产或面临实质破产风险时，有责任考虑公司债权人的利益，或根据公司债权人的利益行事。
在 Sequana 一案中，最高法院将是否存在董事对债权人责任作为先决问题考虑，并一致裁定该责任确实存在（指在该领域“权威立场高度统一”）；该责任的产生修改了确立已久的普通法受托责任，即董事应出于公司利益真诚行事。法院还一致认为，“董事对债权人责任”本身并不是一项另行对债权人承担的独立责任。
董事对债权人责任的适用性和范围
法院在本案中裁决，董事没有违反其对债权人的责任，并驳回了上诉。但在驳回上诉时，法院就董事对债权人责任的范围，亦或是“内容”作出了以下关键结论：
• 法院不同意上诉法院的观点，即仅因极有可能破产（即相比于不破产，更有可能破产）就产生董事对债权人责任，并认为董事对债权人责任不会仅仅因为公司面临既非极有可能也非迫在眉睫的实质破产风险而产生。相反，当董事知道或应该知道公司破产或濒临破产，或公司极有可能进行破产清算或破产管理之时就会产生债权人义务。
• 法院认为，一家公司破产或濒临破产，但破产清算或破产管理并非不可避免之时，债权人利益至上之观点并不正确。在这种情况下，董事应考虑债权人的利益，并在债权人利益与股东利益发生冲突时，平衡两者之间的关系。公司财政越困难，董事就越应当优先考虑债权人利益。但如果破产清算或破产管理不可避免，债权人的利益从股东不再对公司享有任何重要权益之时起摆在首位。
适用于合法公司的分配
在证实已存在董事对债权人责任后，法院继续考虑另一问题，即该责任是否可以适用于董事作出之原本合法的股息支付决定。法院一致裁定可以适用。其依据为英国公司法允许使用资产负债表中的可用利润进行公司分配，并保留这样一种可能性：公司可以在从资产负债表的角度看是具备偿付能力，但从现金流的角度看却是无偿付能力的情况下，合法支付股息。
股东批准
法院还裁定，董事对债权人责任与批准原则并未不一致或不相容，后者可以在公司股东已批准违反责任的情况下，保护董事免受因违反责任而向其提出的索赔。所有法官都明白，批准原则无法适用于在公司破产之时所作的决定或导致公司破产的决定。
在离岸司法管辖区的适用性
在 Sequana 一案的分析中，一个关键部分是 2006 年《英国公司法》各项规定的含义和效力，以及适用于董事责任的英国法律制度与普通法之间的相互影响；尤其是 2006 年《公司法》第 172(3) 节明确承认普通法中存在董事对债权人责任。
我們在下文探讨在百慕大、英属维尔京群岛、开曼群岛、根西岛和泽西岛，当与公司法和破产法有关的相关法律制度与英格兰和威尔士的现行相关法律制度不同时，以及英国最高法院的裁定具有说服力但不具有约束力时，其法院可如何适用 Sequana 一案中的推理。
百慕大
百慕大法院在 Re First Virginia Reinsurance Ltd [2003] Bda LR 47 一案中认为，根据 1981 年《公司法》第 97 节，董事出于公司的最佳利益行事的法定责任，是指在公司破产的情况下，为债权人的最佳利益行事的责任。Kawaley J（以其当时的身份）的推理所依据的成文法和普通法分析与英国最高法院在 Sequana 一案中采用的分析极为相似。
在 First Virginia 一案中，法院判定董事的责任转移到债权人身上依据的是“公司破产法和个人破产法的总括性核心原则，即在债权人得到足额偿付之前，股东和破产者均不得参与破产财产的分配……[百慕大]《破产法》第 72 节（“破产者对盈余享有的权利”）和第 225 节（连同 [百慕大]《公司法》第 158 (g) 节一并理解）对此就有体现”。这项判决自作出以来，经常被百慕大法院采用和适用，以至于常常无需引用直接陈述。
基于上述情况，Sequana 一案的裁决可以对百慕大法律产生的关键影响就是，明确了何时产生董事对债权人责任的问题。可以预计最高法院在第 [203]、[231] 条中的裁决，當董事知道或应当知道公司破产或濒临破产，或公司极有可能进行破产清算或破产管理之时，董事对债权人责任将在百慕大适用。
还有可能的是，在百慕大的背景下，百慕大法院会将可能稍微涉及临时清算视为产生董事对债权人责任，因为百慕大法院已明确表示这类似于根据英国法律进行破产管理。
关于最高法院在 Sequana 一案中的推理是否适用于股息可能变得不合法的情形，该判决不太可能产生重大影响，因为 1981 年《公司法》第 56 节明确规定，如果有合理的理由相信公司现在或在支付股息后将会无法支付其到期债务，或公司资产的可变现价值将因此低于其债务金额，公司不得从实缴盈余中宣派或支付股息，或进行公司分配。百慕大对有关股息支付的成文法规定作了严格解释（例如请参阅百慕大上诉法院在 Belvedere Insurance Company Ltd（清算中）诉 Caliban Holdings Ltd [2001] Bda LR 2 一案中的裁决），因此，最高法院对于董事对债权人责任起判点（即董事知道或应当知道公司破产或濒临破产）的阐述与 1981 年《公司法》第 56 节规定的法定测试，极有可能在几乎所有案件中具有同等范围。
英属维尔京群岛
尽管人们普遍认为英属维尔京群岛普通法明确承认与 West Mercia 规则确立的董事对债权人责任相当的责任，但英属维尔京群岛法院并没有明确适用该规则的公开裁定。
尽管与董事责任相关的普通法毫无疑问地适用，但 2004 年《英属维尔京群岛商业公司法》（以下简称“BCA”）没有包含与 2006 年《英国公司法》第 172 节中的规定相当的一系列详细规定，也没有明确提及董事需要考虑债权人的利益，因此，最高法院确认普通法项下存在董事对债权人责任很可能就能消除对这一问题的疑惑。
但 BCA 第 120 节明确规定，即使出于股东利益行事可能不符合公司自身的最佳利益，也允许董事在特定情况下这样做。尽管受公司章程文件约束，以及在某些情况下需经股东同意，这些规定仍可适用于子公司，允许董事出于母公司及合资公司的最佳利益行事，并允许董事出于对其进行任命的股东的利益行事。
或许出乎意料的是，法院从未考虑过这些规定的含义和范围（在英国公司法中没有对等规定），但这些规定可能与董事对债权人责任相互矛盾，因为最高法院现在认定董事对债权人责任是对公司的受托责任。鉴于这些规定的表述看上去意思明确，即使出于股东利益行事不符合公司利益，也允许董事这样做，董事对债权人责任在适用这些特殊规定的英属维尔京群岛也满足条件这一点，显然有争论的余地。
另外，关于董事对债权人责任可以如何适用于英属维尔京群岛公司原本合法的公司分配的问题，BCA 的规定与英国的规定不同，因为公司董事仅可在公司在紧接股息支付后能够通过 BCA 第 56 节规定的法定偿债能力测试的情况下宣派股息；这项测试检验的是该公司是否有能力偿还到期债务，及其资产价值是否高于其债务价值。因此，笔者认为董事对债权人责任与英属维尔京群岛的分配授权之间实际相关性较低；在这里，相比该裁定是否损害了债权人利益的问题，法院对这一问题的探究将更有可能侧重于英属维尔京群岛法定条文的运用。
开曼群岛
董事责任尚未编入开曼群岛立法，其产生以普通法为依据。
开曼群岛法院此前已承认，董事对债权人责任适用于开曼群岛公司的董事，且其已有现行判例法承认该责任。开曼群岛大法院在 Prospect Properties Limited 诉 McNeill [1990–91 CILR 171] 一案中承认了 West Mercia 规则中规定的责任，且在开曼群岛上诉法院最近对 AHAB 诉 SAAD Investments Company Limited（2021 年 12 月 21 日判决，未公开，2018 年开曼群岛上诉法院 (CICA) 民事案件第 15 号）一案的判决中，开曼群岛上诉法院引用了英国上诉法院在 Sequana 一案中的裁定。开曼群岛上诉法院在 AHAB 一案中表示，Sequana 一案中关于董事对债权人责任仅产生于董事知道或应当知道公司破产或濒临破产之时的认定，与关于开曼群岛法律的立场陈述具有同等适用性。
因此，开曼群岛法院极有可能效仿英国最高法院在 Sequana 一案中对于董事对债权人责任的判决。
Sequana 一案的判决与开曼群岛公司的分配之间可能实际相关性较低。这是因为《公司法》（2022 年修订版）第 34 节设立了向股东进行分配或支付股息的法律框架，其中已经规定，除非在紧接拟定付款日期之后，公司能够通过正常经营偿还到期债务，否则公司向其股东支付此类款项不合法。于公司董事或管理人员而言，公司在无力偿债的情况下支付此类款项，将被视为刑事犯罪。
根西岛
Sequana 一案的判决可能与根西岛的董事责任相关法律相关性甚高。尽管判决中涵盖的很多问题聚焦的都是无法直接适用于根西岛的英国成文公司法事宜，但最高法院就董事对债权人责任的内容和产生作出的总体指导，在根西岛皇家法院受理的案件中可能具有极强的说服力。
根西岛皇家法院 2017 年在 Carlye 案中据象征性意义的判决已明确表明，根西岛法律中存在董事对债权人责任。因此，根西岛很可能会遵循 Sequana 一案中关于该责任的范围和适用性的指导。
此外，关于股东批准，2008 年《（根西岛）公司法》（以下简称“GCL”）第 160 节允许股东通过普通决议批准董事作出超出董事的权力范围或等同于公司涉嫌疏忽大意、违约、违反责任或违反信托的行为。但第 160 节还规定，本规定不影响与有效批准的要求相关的任何其他法规或法律原则，也不影响与无法获得公司批准的行为相关的任何法律原则。因此，关于股东批准的普通法授权仍对根西岛适用。因此，Sequana 一案中关于股东无法批准董事在公司破产之时采取的行动或作出的决定或导致公司破产的行动或决定的认定，在根西岛可能会具有说服力。
最后，如果涉及公司股息，Sequana 一案的判决对根西岛的适用意义可能会降低。如上文所述，英国《公司法》允许使用资产负债表中的可用利润支付股息，与此不同的是，在根西岛，公司仅可在紧接股息支付后能够通过 GCL 第 527 节规定的法定偿债能力测试的情况下宣派股息，通过法定偿债能力测试即表示公司有能力偿还到期债务，且其资产价值高于其债务价值。
泽西岛
1991 年《（泽西岛）公司法》（以下简称“CJL”）第 74 条对董事责任作出了规定，并要求其“出于公司的最佳利益，诚实、善意地行事；并行使一个合理谨慎的人在同等情况下将会行使的谨慎、勤勉和技能”。但 CJL 并非成文法，因此先前存在的习惯法立场仍然有效，并对 CJL 进行了补充。曾有一个泽西岛案件提及了 West Mercia 规则，但那是在一场有关法律费用的听审环境中被提及，因此讨论范围有限，所以仅此一案例也无法得出任何结论。尽管如此，泽西岛的大多数律师都会采用这样的立场：虽然目前没有权威可以证明董事对债权人责任，但其据说是存在的，我们也能经常看到法院听到或认可董事对债权人责任。因此，Sequana 一案非常有助于为这一立场提供更多支持，因为在此类事件中，泽西岛的法院会认为英国最高法院的裁决极具说服力。
相比在其他地方，Sequana 一案中就股息和股东批准问题提出的立场在泽西岛不大可能具有同等重要性。
根据泽西岛法律的规定，破产是指“无力偿还到期债务”。根据 CJL 进行公司分配股息只有在以下情况下才合法：授权公司分配股息的董事发表声明，确认公司在进行分配时具有（现金流）偿债能力，且公司在未来 12 个月内能够继续经营并具有（现金流）偿债能力。
股东批准董事行为在 CJL 项下也是可能的，但条件是通过了适当决议，且公司在待批准的作为或不作为发生后具备（现金流）偿债能力，也就是说，无论如何，如果公司没有偿债能力，就无法完成批准。
